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The U.S. electric power industry has experienced many changed in the last ten years 
due to deregulation and opened to competition. The formation of electricity in California and 
in many parts of the world is based on a sealed bid auction mechanism. In a sealed bid 
auction, each supplier has no knowledge of other suppliers' bids. The primary of this study is 
to investigate a mechanism for increasing a supplier's short-term profitability and the number 
of winning auctions. The new mechanism is based on an ARIMA model in order to forecast 
other suppliers' production costs in this study. The new mechanism is proposed to adjust the 
supplier's offered bid to win on the margin in the auction. This study assumes that the 
majority of production cost for each supplier is from the coal cost. Each supplier constructs 
its offered bid above its cost to maximize a profit. In each experiment, one supplier applies 
the new mechanism and the other suppliers are using the optimal bidding strategy to 
construct their offered bids. The result compares the number of winning auctions and total 
profit between using the new mechanism and using the optimal bidding strategy. 
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CHAPTER 1: GEN REAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The U.S. electric power industry has experienced many changes in the last ten years 
due to the deregulation. The $220 billion industry, which has been called the last great 
government-sanctioned monopoly, is slowly being deregulated and opened to competition. 
In the United States, reforms are being adopted most rapidly in California and the Northeast, 
but many states are trying to introduce completion and reform regulation. There are three 
major fuels used in power generation; coal, oil and natural gas. Over half of the electricity 
being generated comes from coal, a domestically abundant resource, and it is used primarily 
to produce electricity [National Mining Association 2001]. Producing electricity from coal is 
about half the cost of using other fuels, which helps to keep energy costs affordable for 
American families and businesses. Modern technology has helped to eliminate up to 99.5% 
of pollutants from the burning process, making coal an inexpensive, effective, and clean 
source of power. 
During the 1990's, U.S. coal production continued an established growth pattern, 
buttressed by steadily increasing demand for coal for electric power generation. At the same 
time, competing suppliers have been cutting coal prices while delivering a higher quality 
product. Coal-fueled power plants produce 57% of the U.S.'s electricity. The U.S. coal and 
electric power industries are tightly coupled: more than 87 percent of total domestic coal 
consumption is used for generation by utilities, and coal accounts for more than 57 percent 
of utility power generation. Thus, competitive electricity generation markets will have far-
reaching implications for the coal industry. The traditionally stable coal market may absorb 
some of the volatility of electricity markets. Coal remains the cheapest source of power on 
earth, compared to natural gas, oil, and even nuclear energy. An inexpensive energy source 
means a more competitive U.S. economy and lower energy prices for consumers and 
people on fixed and limited incomes. 
In the electric power industry, the emerging electricity market behaves more like an 
oligopoly where the market is dominated by a few suppliers of large firms than the perfectly 
competitive market where no supplier or buyer has the power to influence prices in the 
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market due to a special features such as, a limited numbers of producers, large investment 
size, transmission constraints, and transmission losses when discourages purchase from 
distant suppliers. 
The formation of electricity markets in California and in many parts of the world is 
based on an auction mechanism. The sealed bid auction has been widely used in the 
electricity market format such as in California. Suppliers submit only one sealed bid in each 
auction where each auction is limited by a period of time or duration. Dispatch orders and 
prices are determined using the system marginal price (SMP). In most cases, the market 
price is assumed to be the system marginal price, the price bid for last Megawatts/hour of 
power purchased to meet system demand, and paid to all the accepted suppliers. The 
monthly cost of coal purchased from seven different regions in the U.S. is shown in Figure 1. 
Costs are monthly average costs (cents/Million Btu) received from the U.S. Department of 
Energy [Energy Information Administration Office of Coal, Nuclear, Electric and Alternate 
fuels 1981-1990]. The seven regions include New England, Middle Atlantic, EastNorth 
Central, South Atlantic, EastSouth Central, WestSouth Central, and Pacific. 
Monthly Production Cost of Electrcity from Coal 
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Figure 1: monthly cost of coal purchased from seven regions between January, 1981 and 
December, 1988 
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The x-axis in a Figure 1 represents the time span between January, 1981 and 
December, 1988. The symbols on the x-axis are represented as Year: Month. For example, 
1981: 1 means January, 1981. The y-axis represents the cost of coal purchased to generate 
3 Megawatts electricity per hour. As seen in Figure 1, New England region's cost of coal 
purchased was fluctuated during the first five years of this information as well as Pacific's 
being fluctuated between 1981 and 1984. The other regions' costs of coal between January, 




The primary objective of this work is to investigate a mechanism for increasing a 
supplier's short-term profitability and the number of winning auctions in an electric power 
auction. Short-term refers to a time period of 24 hours to one week. The new mechanism to 
adjust the supplier's offered bid to win on a margin, the highest winning offered bid, is 
proposed and investigated. Assume that all winning suppliers are paid at the system 
marginal price. 
Based on the work of the optimal bidding strategy [Hao 2000], this research will 
investigate the new mechanism to adjust the offered bid to win on the margin under the 
clearing price rule. The clearing pricing rule means that all winning suppliers are paid at the 
highest winning offered bid. This is the price that will be paid to all suppliers by buyers who 
purchase power from the market. This new mechanism will improve the supplier's chance to 
win and receive more profit compared to applying the optimal bidding strategy alone in an 
electric power auction when demand is assumed to know. 
Assume that all suppliers have the same capacity to produce the electric power from 
coal. Ii is assumed that all suppliers produce the same amount of 3 Megawatts-Hour of 
electricity in this study. The first step is to construct forecasting models of competitors' 
production cost from their historical information by employing the Box-Jenkins model 
concept for a short-term time series forecast. The next step is to employ the optimal bidding 
strategy to those competitors' production cost in order to determine their optimal bids. 
Experiments are conducted using the coal cost data presented in Figure 1. The 
investigation will compare the total profit and number of winning auctions for suppliers using 
the new mechanism versus the optimal bidding strategy in 24 auctions. Assume that a 
supplier profits when its offered bid wins and the bid is above its production cost. 
It is assumed that each supplier submits one sealed bid for one block of 3 
Megawatts-Hour in each auction. Standard blocks are assumed for the auction, so that bid 
quantity will not be a factor. The number of winners depends on the number of demands 
(one demand is one block). Information on the number of participating suppliers, number of 
5 
buyers (demand of blocks) and an interval for production cost are usually assumed to be 
known for all suppliers. The question to be addressed is - will forecasts of competitors' 
production costs and the new mechanism help a supplier increase its short-term profit and 
number of winning bids? 
6 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
For nearly half a century, the U.S. utility companies operated as regulated 
monopolies characterized by controlled prices. The electric utility industry was considered as 
natural monopolies marked by economies in scale and size of output making competition 
wasteful. The chapter begins by reviewing brief history of the U.S. electric utility section then 
followed by auction systems section. The next section is applying a concept of a short-term 
times series methods for forecasting electricity and, finally, applying the optimal bidding 
strategy for the suppliers in the electric power auction. 
2.1 Development in the Policy Context 
The regulatory policies for utility industry can be summarized by the following acts 
and regulations. The history of regulation in the U.S. electric industry began when the 
Federal Power Act of 1935 [Congressional Record 1995] conferred regulatory authority for 
wholesale, interstate energy transactions to the Federal Power Commission (FPC). FPC 
was the precursor to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERG) created in 1977. 
The Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) of 1935 was passed to give the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) the authority to break up utility holding companies for the 
malpractice of excessive charges. 
The Clean Air Act of 1970 conferred the responsibilities of monitoring the 
environmental standards to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The majority of 
electric power generation dependent on fossil fuel was affected by this regulation. The 
Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) of 1978 [Abel 1992] was one of the important 
early developments to restructure the electric industry. PURPA consisted of seven titles of 
which Title I , II , and IV were related to the utility industry. Those titles described the retail 
regulatory policies for electric utility, competition in electric utility industry, and focused on 
small hydroelectric power projects. 
In 1988, the FERG proposed changed to regulations [U.S. Congress 1988] to 
promote competition in bidding and independent power production. The U.S. Senate passed 
a comprehensive National Energy Policy Act (NEPA) in 1992 [Congressional Research 
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Service 1993] to facilitate the growth of free market electricity. The act consisted of thirty 
titles of which Title I was the most significant. It focused on energy efficiency issues: 
reducing the cost of efficiency improvement for generation, transmission, and distribution 
facilities. In March 1995, FERG proposed to deregulate the wholesale power market 
[Federal Energy Regulatory commission 1995] by instituting new rules on open access 
transmission. This ruling meant changes in the sale of electricity between electric utilities 
and electricity providers. Invariably, this meant an end to electric utility monopolies. 
It appeared that the FERG was ready to move far beyond previous pricing policies 
for electric power industry. Many state utility commissions have already taken initiatives to 
restructure the utility industry in accordance with the federal proposal. In 1996, the state 
legislature of California approved Assembly Bill (AB) of 1990 [Ballance 1996]. The law 
became effective in January 1998, and began a four-year transition to deregulate elements 
of the electric utility industry. The goal of AB 1890 was to create a competitive marketplace 
for electricity that would result in reliable sources of energy and lower prices for consumers. 
The deregulation legislation created two new public agencies to manage California's energy: 
the California Independent System Operator (Cal-ISO) and California Power Exchange 
(CalPX). The ISO is responsible for ensuring the reliable transmission of electricity 
throughout California. The CalPX is a commodity trading exchange that buys and sells 
energy on the open market for California electric utilities 
2.2 Auction as a Market Institution 
An auction market can be considered as a trading institution where buyers and 
sellers can readily meet to maximize their trade gains. McAfee and McMilan (1987) defined 
auction as "a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining resource allocation 
and prices on the basis of bids from market participations." In standard auction institutions 
such as Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT} and New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), all 
the trade units are standardized. The only component of the trade unit that varies is the 
price. The market participants efficiently decide for transactions on the basis of prices only. 
The auction system is a very efficient way to move from cost-based operation to price-based 
operation. Post (1994) and Sheble (1993) presented a detailed study of auction institution. 
Post and Sheble described four standard types of auction institution: English auction, Dutch 
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auction, the first-price sealed-bid auction, and the second-price sealed-bid auction. These 
auction mechanisms employ different methodologies of trading. The sealed-bid auction is 
typically used for government procurement contracts. 
The English auction is the auction most commonly used for selling goods; the price is 
successively raised until one bidder remains. The word "auction" is derived from the Latin 
augere, which means, "to increase". The Dutch auction is the reverse of the English auction 
for which the auctioneer calls an initial high price and then lowers the price until one bidder 
accepts the current price. The Dutch auction is used, for example, for selling cut flowers in 
the Netherlands, fish in Israel, and tobacco in Canada. For a first-price sealed-bid auction, 
potential buyers submit sealed bids and the highest bidder is awarded the item. In a sealed-
bid auction, each bidder can submit only one bid. For the first-price sealed bid auctions are 
used in the auctioning of mineral rights for U.S. government-owned land, sales of artwork, 
real estate, etc. Under the second-price sealed-bid auction, bidders submit a sealed bid. 
The highest bidder wins the item but pays a price equal not to his own bid but to the second-
highest bid. Both the first-price sealed-bid and the second-price sealed-bid auction 
maximizes the trade gains of the market participants. 
Smith (1974) presented a slight variation on the first-price sealed-bid auction called a 
discriminative sealed bid auction. In this case, the sale quantity is fixed at a specific amount. 
Smith also presented a variant of the second-price sealed-bid auction for a homogeneous 
commodity. This variant is called the competitive sealed-bid auction that was the same as 
discriminative sealed bid except that all bids were filled at the price of the lowest accepted 
bid. Of the various auction institutions, a sealed-bid method appears to be operationally and 
structurally suitable for the deregulated electricity industry. 
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2.3 Examples of Short-Term Forecasting Concept and Optimal Bidding Strategy in the 
Power Market 
2.3.1 Short-Term Forecasting in the Power Market 
One of the characteristics of the electric power production is that power it cannot be 
conveniently store. Therefore, at every instant of time there should be a sufficient amount of 
electricity production to meet demand. Load forecasting is an important part of electric 
power system operations. Short-term forecasts of an hour ahead or a day ahead load are 
needed for economic scheduling of generating capacity. An ARIMA time series model 
forecasts the current value by means of a linear combination of previous values. 
The time series concept has been used previously in the electric power industry to 
forecast load, production cost, etc. Zunko and Komprej (1991) applied the Box-Jenkins time 
series analysis methods for a short-term load forecasting of daily electric power 
consumption data in Slovenia. They concluded that the Box-Jenkins approach proved to be 
a very efficient way for forecasting load. Valenzuela and Mazumdar (2000) introduced the 
statistical analysis of electric power production costs. Monte Carlo simulation was used to 
study time series analysis of actual load data to estimate a production cost. The estimated 
production cost was derived from contributions of the demand and the generator 
availabilities. In the current regulated climate, production-costing models are widely used in 
the electric power industry by the individual utilities for the purpose of forecasting the cost of 
electricity production. 
2.3.2 Optimal Bidding Strategy in the Power Market 
Theoretically, in a perfectly competitive market, suppliers should bid at, or very close 
to, their marginal production cost to maximize their profit. However, the electricity market is 
not a perfectly competitive market and suppliers may benefit by bidding higher than their 
marginal cost. The optimal bidding strategy is a method of determining a bid that maximizes 
benefit based on a supplier's costs, constraints, and anticipation of rival and market 
behavior. Lamont and Rajan (1997) proposed a simple sub-optimal bidding strategy for the 
situation where two buyers are competing for a single block of energy but it cannot be 
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extended to the general case of multiple suppliers. Visudhiphan and Ilic (1999) proposed a 
dynamic model of strategic bidding for the situation with three power suppliers by utilizing 
the historical and current market clearing prices. This model is heuristic in principle, and is 
not directly applicable to the general case with more than three suppliers. Shangyou Hao 
(2000) proposed a bidding behavior model of suppliers in electricity auction markets under 
clearing pricing rule and with some simplified bidding assumptions. His proposed strategy 
will be presented in detail in the next chapter and applied in the model chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
The chapter has four sections. The first section is an overview of the new 
mechanism to adjust the supplier's offered bid to win on the margin in the electric power 
auction. Suppose that there are n suppliers and m demands and the number of suppliers is 
greater than the number of demands. Let P = { p1, p 2 , .•• ,Pn-I} be the set of competitors' 
forecast production costs. The next step is to sort P ascending order. Let bm-i and bm be 
the optimal offered bid having forecasted production costs Pm-i and Pm, respectively, using 
the optimal bidding strategy. For each auction, bm is the winner with the highest offered bid 
and bm-i is the second highest offered bid. 
The next step is to apply the optimal bidding strategy with Pm-i and Pm from the 
previous step in order to determine the optimal offered bids, bm-i and bm where bm-i ~ bm . 
The last step is to find the average offered bids between bm-i and bm . This mechanism 
uses the average of bm-i and bm in order to maximize the probability of bidding between 
bm-i and bm . It is also assumed that the average bid is the mean or expectation between 
bm-i and bm. This is based on the assumption that bm-t and bm are random variables with 
normal distributions and the same standard deviation. 
The next section is an overview of the short-term forecast ARIMA model. A three-
stage procedure is followed to find a good model to forecast each competitor's future 
production cost based on its historical production cost. These three stages are identification 
(find an ARIMA model), estimation (estimate the parameters of the ARIMA model from the 
identification's stage), and diagnostic (check the model for adequacy) (Pankratz 1983). After 
completing the three-stage procedure, the forecast will be performed. 
The third section is an overview of the optimal bidding strategy. This study assumes 
that every supplier follows this strategy and no supplier prefers to change the strategy. The 
reason is because it would simplify the result of the new mechanisms when all suppliers are 
employing the same strategy. The optimal bidding strategy was modeled based on bidding 
behaviors of suppliers in electric auction markets under the clearing pricing rule. The 
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clearing pricing rule means that all winning suppliers are paid at the highest winning offered 
bid. This strategy assumed that each supplier's offered bid is above its production cost. The 
difference between the production cost and the optimal offered bid is called the markup. The 
markup is calculated from the probability to win on and below the margin. The margin bid is 
assumed to be the highest winning bid in the auction. Those probabilities are determined 
from all suppliers' distributed production cost range, the number of demands, and the 
number of suppliers participating. 
The last section is an overview of how to apply the optimal bidding strategy with the 
new mechanism. There are three experiments in this study and each experiment has four 
cases. Those four cases are seven suppliers with two demands, seven suppliers with three 
demands, seven suppliers with four demands, and seven suppliers with five demands. The 
production cost range is assumed between $14 and $23 per 3 Megawatts-Hour based on 
the production cost of coal during 1984-1988 in Figure 1. The JavaScript web page is 
employed in order to calculate the optimal offered bid in each case. 
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3.1 The new mechanism to adjust the offered bid to win on a margin 
In this research, Hao's strategy (2000) is used in conjunction with the new 
mechanism to adjust the supplier's offered bid to win on the margin in the electric power 
auction. The goal is to determine if we can achieve more profit in the short-term and a 
greater probability of winning. Hence, in this study, if one supplier employs a forecast time 
series model to predict competitors' production cost together with the new mechanism to 
adjust its bid to win on the margin in an electric power auction and assume that all 
competitors also employ the optimal bidding strategy, will it have more chance to win and 
more profit compared with using the optimal bidding strategy alone? Assume that one 
supplier has estimated historical production costs of competitors based on the cost of coal 
that was purchased from seven different regions. Also, it is assumed that all competitors 
employ the optimal bidding strategy in order to make up their optimal bids. The main cost of 
production is assumed to be from the cost of coal purchased. In Figure 2 below, the 
procedure of adjusting one supplier's offer bid to win on a margin is presented. 
Begin 
+ 
1) Apply an ARIMA model to forecast each competitor's production cost. Let 
P = { p 1, p 2 , ... ,Pn-i} be the set of competitors' forecast production cost 
+ 
2) Sort the results from step 1) in ascending order as follow: 
P1 :s: P2 :s: p3 :s: ... :s: Pn-I where n = number of suppliers 
+ 
3) Apply the optimal bidding strategy with Pm-i and Pm to construct their offered 
optimal bid where m = number of demand and m < n . Their optimal offered bid 
are bm-1 and bm . 
+ 
I 4) Find the average offered optimal bid between bm-i and bm . I 
+ 
I End 
Figure 2: Bid Adjustment Procedure 
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As seen from Figure 2, the bid adjustment procedure begins by applying an ARIMA 
model to forecast each competitor's production cost. Each competitor's ARIMA model is 
constructed based on the monthly historical cost of coal purchased. The historical cost of 
coal was obtained from the U.S. Department of Energy [Energy Information Administration 
Office of Coal, Nuclear, Electric and Alternate fuels 1981-1990] for January 1981 and 
December 1988. It is assumed that the number of suppliers is much greater than the 
number of demands. Therefore, no supplier has incentive to raise its offered bid so high in 
order to receive more profit because it will lose the auction when there are less demands 
compared to many suppliers. To simplify this study, assume that buyers purchase the 
electricity via the market. The first step is to find a good ARIMA model to forecast each 
competitor's production cost. The result of this step is ARIMA models for each competitor. 
Then apply the ARIMA model to forecast the production cost. Let P= {pt,p2 , ... ,pn-t} be the 
set of competitors' forecast production costs. 
The second step is to sort the forecast production costs in ascending order from the 
previous step and assign them as follows: Pt ..:;, p 2 ..:;, p 3 ..:;, ... ..:;, Pn-t where n = number of 
suppliers. For example, if there are six suppliers (the supplier itself and five competitors) and 
those competitors' forecast production costs are $16, $14.5, $13, $15.5, and $14 per 3 
Megawatts-Hour, then tHe result of ascending sort is $13::::; $14 ::::; $14.5 ::::; $15.5 ::::; $16 
per 3 Megawatts-Hour, respectively. Then assigning $13 as Pt, $14 as p 2 , $14.5 as p 3 , 
$15.5 as p 4 , and $16 as p 5 . The third step is to pick Pm-i and Pm to construct their offered 
optimal bids based on the optimal bidding strategy where m = number of demand and 
m < n . The JavaScript program to construct the offered optimal bid based on the optimal 
bidding strategy is in the last section. The optimal offered bid is calculated from the equation 
(3.22). The probability of winning but not on the margin is derived from the equation (3.14) 
and the probability of winning on the margin is from the equation (3.15). Assume that the 
interval production cost is known. 
In fact, the winning bid on the margin in the auction might be different from the 
expected winning bid on the margin calculated from this mechanism. Hence, Pm-i and Pm 
are chosen to construct the optimal offered bid. For example, if there are three demands, 
then pick p 2 and p 3 , and apply them with the optimal bidding strategy. After this step, two 
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optimal offered bids, bm-t and bm, are determined. The optimal bidding strategy will be 
described in the third section of this chapter. The last step is to find the average offered 
optimal bid from the previous step. 
The concept of the ARIMA model emphasizes recent past data for the short-term 
forecast. It would be more effective if the ARIMA model is recalculated each time as a new 
production cost becomes available. That means repeating the entire cycle of identification, 
estimation, and diagnostic checking must be repeated. The next production cost for each 
competitor may be greater or lower than what the ARIMA model of that competitor would 
forecast. Therefore, the forecast may be not reliable and accurate if we use the same 
ARIMA model for all the future production cost in this study. This cycle can be repeated 
quickly with a new production cost because the original model provides a good guide. 
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3.2 Overview of the short-term forecasting ARIMA model 
Box-Jenkins models are often referred to as Auto-Regressive Integrated Moving 
Average (ARIMA) models. A good overview of the basic theory and modeling procedures 
can be found in [Pankratz 1983], [Pankratz 1991], and [Enders 1996]. Using the 
recommended three-stage procedure [Pankratz 1983] shown in Figure 3, an ARIMA model 
was constructed and evaluated. The three-stage procedure is consisted of Identification 
stage (find the ARIMA model), Estimation stage (estimate the parameters of the ARIMA 
model from the identification's stage), and Diagnostic stage (check the model for adequacy). 
Forecast 
Stage 1 : Identification 
Choose one or more ARIMA models as 
candidates 
Stage 2: Estimation 
Estimate the parameters of the models 
chosen from stage 1 
Stage 3: Diagnostic 
Check the candidate model for adequacy 
Yes No 
Figure 3: Flowchart of three-stage procedure for finding a good model. 
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3.2.1 Identification Stage 
In the identification stage, stationary of the series was examined. The stationary 
concept helps to get useful estimates of parameters from historical information. 
Characteristics of stationary time series have a mean (sum of observations and divide by the 
number of observations), variance (measure the dispersion of the observations around the 
mean), and autocorrelation function or ACF (measure the statistical relationships between 
observations in a data series) that are essentially constant through time. 
At this stage, autocorrelation function (ACF) and partial autocorrelation function 
(PACF) are investigated. ACF is used to calculate the autocorrelation coefficient. The 
estimated autocorrelation coefficient, rk, is determined from monthly production cost 
separated by k times periods within a time series. It measures the direction and strength of 
the statistical relationship between ordered pairs of production costs on two random 
variables. It is a dimensionless number that can take on values between -1 and +1. If rk = 0 
then the production cost at time t, z1 , is not correlated to the cost k periods from t, z 1+k. A 
value of -1 means perfect negative correlation and +1 means perfect positive correlation. 
A decay curve for rk is an indicator for a series of data that it is stationary. Let rk be 
an autocorrelation coefficient of order k, z1 be a production cost at month t, z be a mean of 
this series, n be the number of production costs, and k be a lag length or number of time 






Plotting rk versus k should show a rapid exponential decay-toward-zero or damp out 
pattern (suggesting a stationary ACF). It also shows that samples far from each other are 
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independent. Box and Jenkins (1976) suggest that about 50 observations is the minimum 
required number of observations to build the ARIMA model. 
Based on the result of the ACF, the partial autocorrelation function (PACF) is 
obtained for a series as below where an estimated partial autocorrelation coefficient, i>kk , 
measures the relationship between z1 and zt+k. Let z1 be z1 - z where z1 is a production 
cost of the data series at time t and z is a mean production cost of this series. 
(k = 2,3, ... ) (3.2) 
(k= 3,4, ... ;j= 1,2, ... , k-1) 
The estimated i>kk is broadly similar to the estimated rk . The estimated i>kk is also a 
graphical representation of the statistical relationship between sets of ordered pair ( z1 , ~+k ) 
drawn from a single time series. Plotting i>kk versus k should show a rapid decay pattern. 
However, many production costs are nonstationary (a mean is not constant through 
time). Therefore, differencing requires the transformation of a nonstationary to stationary. 
The differencing is a procedure for dealing with a nonstationary mean before choosing ACF 
and PACF. A series can be differenced once (d=1) by calculating the period-to-period 
changes. 
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3.2.2 Estimation Stage 
Univariate Box-Jenkins (UBJ-ARIMA) models are especially suited to short-term 
forecasting time-series because they place heavy emphasis on the recent past rather than 
the distant past [Box and Jenkins 1976]. An ARIMA model is an algebraic statement stating 
how the production cost ( z1 ) are related to its past production costs ( zt-1 , z1_ 2 , z1_ 3 , ••• ). It 
deals only with data measured at equally space, discrete time intervals. Time-series data 
may display a periodic behavior pattern, a pattern that repeats every s time where s 
represents the length of periodicity and s > 1. In this study, s =12 months. UBJ-ARIMA 
models are also particularly useful for forecasting data series that contain the seasonal 
observations. With the seasonal observations, the periodic differencing is z1 - z1_ 5 • The 
estimated rk and /Jkk are considered at multiples of lag s ( s , 2s , 3s, ... ). 
At this stage, precise estimates of the coefficients of the model chosen at the 
Identification stage are investigated by fitting a model to the available data series. Based on 
the idea of the lag length, which is obtained by an examination of coefficient for 
autoregressive (AR) terms from ACF and moving average (MA) terms from PACF are 
estimated by computer software, RATS (Regression Analysis of Time Series) [Enders 1996]. 
3.2.2.1 ARIMA algebraic form 
Since the production cost in this study is monthly ranging over eight years, 
seasonality is expected. Let P be the maximum lag length on seasonal AR term, Q be the 
maximum lag length on seasonal MA term, D be the number of seasonal differencing, and s 
be the length of seasonal differencing (for example, s=12 for monthly). The model will be 
estimated with a seasonal autoregressive (SAR) term, C!>P(Bs), and a seasonal moving 
average (SMA) term, E>Q(Bs) in equation (3.3). Also a seasonal differencing, V~, in 
equation (3.3) is considered as a possibility. A Time series data often display periodic 
behavior or seasonal that has a pattern which repeats every s time periods where s > 1. 
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Backshift notation is a convenient way of representing ARIMA processes and 
models. Let p, the lag length of the last PACF spike, be the orders of the AR operator. Let q, 
the lag length of the last ACF spike, be the order of the MA operator, and d be the number 
of differencing. Let ¢P(B) be the p-order AR, Bq(B) be the q-order MA, and \ld be the d-
order differencing. 
The backshift operator B; is used to multiply any time-subscripted variable. The 
result is that the time subscript is shifted back by i time periods. An 
ARIMA(p,d,q)(P,D,Q)s represents that (p,d,q) is the nonseasonal order and (P,D,Q)s is 
the seasonal order. The ARIMA( p,d,q)(P,D,Q)s process can be written in a form of the 
backshift notation as follows 
where, 
(3.3) 
¢P(B) = (1-¢1B-¢2B 2 - ••• -¢PBP) or the nonseasonal AR operator 
Bq(B) = (l-B1B-B2B 2 - ••• -BqBq) or the nonseasonal MA operator 
<I> p(B 5 ) = (1-<I> sBs - <l>25B 25 - ... -<l>PsBPs) or the seasonal AR operator 
E>Q(Bs) = (1-E>sBs -0 25B 25 - ... -eQsBQs) or the seasonal MA operator 
\ld = (1- B)d or the nonseasonal differencing 
\1 s n = (1- Bs )n or the seasonal differencing 
z1 = z, -µ 
21 
3.2.3 Diagnostic Stage 
At this stage, some diagnostic checks are required to determine if an estimated 
model is statistically adequate. The model that fails diagnostic tests is rejected and the 
procedure will begin at the Identification stage again to find another estimated model. 
Bartlett (1946) derived an approximate expression for the standard error of rk. Let n be the 
number of production costs. This estimated standard error, s(rk) is calculated as follows: 
k-1 
s(rk) = (1+2 L rf )1/2 n-1/2 
}=1 
(3.4) 
The estimated standard error is used to test the null hypothesis H 0 : PK= 0 fork= 
1,2,3, ... The null hypothesis is tested by finding out how far away the sample statistic rk is 
from the hypothesized value PK= 0, where how far is at-statistic equal to a certain number 
of estimated standard errors. The t-statistic is approximated as follows: 
(3.5) 
The result of trk implies that if about 5% of the possible rk falls two or more 
estimated standard errors away from zero (PK = 0 ), then the null hypothesis PK = 0 will be 
rejected since rk is significantly different from zero at about 5% level. In a similar way, the 
A 
estimated standard error and t-statistic for <Ak can be tested as follows: 
(3.6) 
(3.7) 
where: n = the number of production costs 
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The null hypothesis is tested by H 0 : </Jkk = 0. If the absolute t-statistic of </Jkk is greater 
than 2.0 (two or more estimated standard errors), it implies that</Jkk is different from zero at 
about 5% significance level and the null hypothesis </Jkk = 0 is rejected. The statistically 
adequate model is the one whose random shocks (a,) are not autocorrelated. The 
estimated random shock a, or a residual for any ARIMA model can be calculated by 
subtracting the calculated value from z, 
a, =z,-z, (3.8) 
z, is calculated from estimates of parameters rather than known parameters of z, 
and depends on u , estimated mean, and the estimated AR and MA coefficients (along with 
their corresponding past z sand past residuals.) z, is an observed value at time t. 
Ljung and Box (1978) and Devies (1977) suggest a test statistic based on all the 
residual autocorrelations as a set. Since it is tedious to check the correlation for all the 
residuals. If H 0 : pK(a) = 0 indicates that the acceptance of the null hypothesis that no 
correlations up to lag K exist. Let PK be the corresponding parameter on all K residual as a 
set and K be the number of residual autocorrelations jointly tested by the null hypothesis 
about the correlations among the random shocks and by a Q• statistics as follows 
H 0 : p 1(a) = p 2 (a) = ... = PK(a) = 0 





n = number of production costs used to estimate the model 




Q* has a x2 distribution with (K - m) degree of freedom, where m is the number of 
parameters estimated in the ARIMA model. If Q* is large (significantly different from zero) at 
10% level, then the residual autocorrelation as a set is significantly different from zero and 
the random shocks of the estimated model are probably autocorrelated. If the calculated of 
Q* exceeds the appropriate value in a chi-square table in Appendix B, the null hypothesis of 
no significant autocorrelations should be rejected. The null hypothesis is found as; H 0 : all 
residuals up to lag k are not correlated. Rejecting the null hypothesis means accepting an 
alternative that at least one autocorrelation is not zero. 
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3.3 Overview of the optimal bidding strategy 
The optimal bidding strategy extends the model of traditional first-price auction 
bidding strategy to supplier's behavior in electricity markets under a clearing-pricing rule. In 
this scenario, all winning suppliers are paid at the highest winning offered bid. Under a 
clearing price auction, a supplier winning on the margin, highest winning offered bid, will be 
paid at the clearing price equal to its bid. To a suppliers winning below the margin, the effect 
of the clearing price rule is very similar to that of the second price rule [Vickrey 1961], all 
winning suppliers winning are paid the second highest winning bid. The strategy constructs 
a bid as a function of a supplier's production cost and the cost distributions of other 
suppliers. The strategy assumes that all suppliers know the numbers of suppliers and 
demands as well as the interval production cost. 
Let C; be the production cost of a supplier i and b; be its bid. Let competitors' 
production costs be a random variable C drawn from a cost distribution density 
function /(C) over [ C1, C2 ] where C1 is the lowest and C2 is the highest production cost, 
respectively. C is assumed to have a uniform distribution. Let Pr{B(C) > b;} be the 
probability that at least one competitor bids more than b; and Pr{B(C) < b;} be the 
probability that at least one competitor bids less than b;. Based on the uniform distribution 
function, the probabilities are given by 
Pr{B(C) > b;} = Pr{C > B-1(b;) = c;} = (C2 -c;)/(C2 -C1) and (3.11) 
Pr{B(C) < b;} = Pr{C < B-1(b;) = c;} = (c; -c1)/(C2 -C1). (3.12) 
There are three outcomes for the supplier: winning on the margin, winning below the 
margin, and losing. Let R(B-1(b;)) be the probability that a supplier who wins the auction, 
but not on the margin, n be the number of suppliers, and m be the numbers of demands. 
The probability that a supplier wins but not on the margin is given by 
(3.13) 
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This sums the probabilities found by using a binomial distribution for the number of 
winners not on the margin. The upper limit is m - 2 because there are m winners but two of 
them, a supplier and one competitor being win on the margin. The other m - 2 winners win 
bi but not on the margin. Let H(B-1(bJ) in (3.14) be the probability that bidder i exactly 
wins the auction on the margin. This is the probability that exactly m -1 bidders bid less 
than bi and is given by 
However, the common objective for each supplier is to maximize its expected profit. 
Let the winning bid on the margin be w, the payoff ;r for the supplier i is ( w- ci) if bi wins 
the auction but not on the margin and be bi - ci if bid bi is on the margin. Therefore, the 
expected payoff function, tr( bi), is the sum above of the two terms weighted by their 
probability of occurrence in (3.15). This can be expressed as, 
(3.15) 
Differentiating (3.15) with respect to bi maximizes the payoff giving 
dtr = H(B-i(b.)) +[dH(B-1(bJ) dB-1(bJ (b. -c.) 
db. 1 dB-1(b.) db. 1 1 
l l l (3.16) 
Rewriting (3.16) by applying the formula of inverse function differentiation produces 
dB [dH dR ] -H+ -(B-cJ+-(w-cJ =0. 
dci dci dci 
(3.17) 
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Let - be H , - be R , and - be B , then (3.17) can be rearranged as, (dHJ . (dRJ . (dBJ .
de; de; de; 
(BH)' =(H +R)'c -R'w. (3.18) 
Integrating (3.18) from c to C2 we obtains (3.19). Because the supplier must auction 
between c and C 2 in order to obtain a profit. If it wins with the offered bid below its cost, it 
will not maximize a profit. The boundary condition when c = C 2 is H(B-1(b) = C 2 ) = 0 and 
R(B-1(b) = C 2 ) = 0 because the probability to win on and below the margin with the highest 
cost C 2 is zero. 
ci 
B(C2 )H(C2 )-B(c)H(c) = f (H + R)'cdc-[R(C2 )-R(c)}w. (3.19) 
c 
Applying the integration by part formula and boundary condition in (3.19) yields 
ci 
J (H(c) + R(c))dc 
B(c) = c + c (w-c)R(c) 
H(c) H(c) 
(3.20) 
The equation (3.20) is dependent on the estimated winning bid, w. However, the 
general bidding strategy in (3.20) is not useful because it depends on the estimated winning 
bid. If the supplier acts as it was on the margin, the winning bid on the margin is 
b = w = B( c) , then a new function can be defined as follows 




From (3.21) above, the optimal bid is based on the supplier's production cost plus 
the markup. The amount of mark up depends on the probability of winning below and on the 
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margin that are computed from the cost distribution of all suppliers, market demand, and the 
number of suppliers participating in the auction. 
28 
3.4 Overview of how to apply the optimal bidding strategy in this study 
The optimal bidding strategy assumes that the number of suppliers, number of 
demands and the interval production cost are known. In this study, the production cost 
range for competitors is between $14 and $23 per 3 Megawatts-Hour based on the 
production cost of coal during 1984-1988 in Figure 1. Competitors use the current 
production cost for c; in the next period. As mentioned before, there are four cases in each 
experiment. After receiving the forecast production costs of competitors and picking Pm-i 
and Pm , those two forecast production costs are applied in the optimal bidding strategy 
using the same range for C1 and C 2 (i.e., $14-$23). In each case, construct the optimal bid 
for the production cost Pm first. The equation (3.13) is calculated to find the probability of 
Pm to win the auction but not on the margin and the equation (3.14) is also calculated to find 
the probability of Pm to win the auction on the margin. Then apply those two probabilities in 
the equation (3.21) to derive its optimal offered bid, bm. The optimal offered bid bm-t can be 
also calculated from the equation (3.13), (3.14), and (3.21 ). The JavaScript web-based 
programs are written for each case in order to demonstrate the probability to win the auction 
but not on the margin, on the margin, and find the optimal offered bid. The user of this 
program must fill the following information in the text boxes in order to calculate the optimal 
offered bid: number of suppliers, number of demands, interval production cost, and its cost 
of production. For example, Figure 1 in Appendix C is the JavaScript web-based program to 
calculate the optimal offered bids, bm-i and bm , when there are seven suppliers and two 
demands in the first case. After filling those five text boxes and submitting, the program will 
display the probability to win the auction but not on the margin, the probability to win the 
auction on the margin, and the combination of those probabilities. If submitting another 
button located near the left bottom corner, the optimal offered bid will be displayed. The 
source code for this program is in Table 1 in Appendix C. The JavaScript web-based 
programs to calculate the optimal offered bid in the second case, the third case, and the 
fourth case are in Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 4 in Appendix C, respectively. Their source 
codes are also in Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4 in Appendix C. 
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CHAPTER 4: MODELS AND RESULTS 
Due to the confidential information of each supplier's production cost and the 
prevalent use of coal to generate power, monthly production costs of coal (cents/million Btu) 
were used from the Energy Information Administration Office of Coal, Nuclear, Electric and 
Alternate fuels 1981-1990 reports. The monthly production costs of seven different regions 
(New England, Middle Atlantic, EastNorth Central, South Atlantic, EastSouth Central, 
WestSouth Central, and Pacific) in the United States are used to present each supplier's 
monthly production cost to conduct this study. The standard Megawatts-Hours block, 3 
Megawatts per hour, is assumed for each auction, so that bid quantity will not be a decision 
variable. Production cost data for the last 24 months (January, 1989 - December, 1990) was 
used as future production costs in evaluating the accuracy of the forecasted values by the 
models. Therefore, monthly costs between 1981 and 1988; the sample size was 96 for each 
supplier throughout this study. 
Cost of production depends on multiple factors such as cost accounting practices, 
fuel costs, maintenance costs, operation and upgrade costs and, other costs. Given the 
prevalent use of coal, it is reasonable to use coal costs as an indicator for the production 
costs. In this research, it is assumed that the majority of the production cost is accounted for 
by coal costs. Each region is assumed to be one supplier for this study. Distribution costs 
are not considered. The cost of coal purchased was calculated in dollars per 3 Megawatts-
Hour from the average cost (cents/million BTU). 
By considering the production cost from the U.S. Department of Energy ( 1981-
1990), this study assumes that each standard block contains 3 Megawatts-Hour and each 
supplier can bid for only one block for each auction. Based on the optimal bidding strategy, 
the demand, information on the number of suppliers and cost distribution is assumed known 
to all suppliers. 
It is assumed that all competitors construct their optimal offered bid with the optimal 
bidding strategy in order to maximize their profit if they win in the sealed bid auction. In 
addition, no competitor has an incentive to apply any strategies other than that strategy 
mentioned earlier. All winners are paid at the margin bid. It is also assumed that demand is 
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constant across all time periods. Production costs of coals are determined by assuming 
3,412 Btu of coal can produce 1 Kilowatt-Hour of an electric power [University of 
Washington, department of Mechanical Engineering 2000]. 
4.1 Models 
There are three experiments in this study. In each experiment, one supplier is being 
as a supplier applying the new mechanism and the other six suppliers are using the optimal 
bidding strategy. There are four cases in each experiment (see Table 1 below). In those 
cases, the number of suppliers is held constant while the number of demands changes. This 
study selects three suppliers; Middle Atlantic, EastNorth Central, and Pacific, as being the 
supplier applying the new mechanism and other suppliers use the optimal bidding strategy. 
Therefore, Middle Atlantic is a supplier and the other six suppliers are competitors in the first 
experiment. EastNorth Central is a supplier and the other six suppliers are competitors in the 
second experiment. And Pacific is a supplier and the other six suppliers are competitors in 
the last experiment. 
Table 1: Four cases being conducted in this study 
Number of Number of 
suppliers demands 
First case 7 2 
Second case 7 3 
Third case 7 4 
Fourth case 7 5 
Again, all seven suppliers' production costs are collected from January, 1981 to 
December, 1990, plotted in ACF and PACF graphs, and modeled in the ARIMA models. The 
chapter begins with a general modeling using a Box-Jenkins ARIMA model, namely 
identification, estimation and diagnostics, for all suppliers. 
Next, applying the optimal bidding strategy and the a mechanism to conduct a 
monthly sealed bid auction. A graph for each case shows three bids: the supplier's optimal 
offered bid, the supplier's average bid, and the margin bid of the winning bid being won on 
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the margin. The optimal offered bid is the supplier's optimal bid calculated from the optimal 
bidding strategy. The margin bid is the highest winning bid supposed to win in the auction. 
And the average bid is the bid calculated from the a mechanism. Finally, the results are 
evaluated by comparing a total profit and number of winning auctions between applying the 
new mechanism and applying the optimal bidding strategy alone for 24 auctions. Both 
average bid and optimal bid can win the auction if they are less than the margin bid. 
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Figure 2: New England with ARIMA(1, 1, 1) 
From New England's production cost in Figure1 in Appendix A and its ACF and 
PACF graph in the Identification step in figure 2 in Appendix A, its ACF slowly decays to 
zero indicating that the mean of the production costs is nonstationary. Therefore, 
differencing is required. The differenced ACF and PACF of New England were presented in 
Figure 2 above. The shape of differenced ACF and PACF suggests the ARIMAl(1, 1, 1) 
model with C being constrained to zero because their lags quickly cut off toward zero after 
lag 1. The ARIMA(1, 1, 1) implies that the mean of its production cost is not stationary (its 
production cost appears to be down through time). 
From Table 2 below, all coefficients are statistical.ly significant different from zero 
roughly at the 5% level because their absolute t-statistic values, in parenthesis after their 
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coefficients, are more than 2.0. Coefficients may vary each time when recalculating the 
ARIMA model. Q-statistics are tested for a group of residual autocorrelations calculated at 
lag 8 and 16, respectively, and they do not exceed the appropriate value in a chi-square 
table in Table 1 in Appendix B. So the ARIMA(1, 1, 1) is suitable for New England supplier. 
Those two coefficients in an equation in Table 2 below are calculated at December 1988 to 
forecast New England's production cost in January 1989. 
Table 2: New England in Estimation and Diagnostic steps 
New England ARIMA(1, 1, 1) with C constrained to zero 
Coefficients 
Backshift notation 
¢1 = -0.57519 (-3.40439), ()1 = 0.83653 (7.40147) 
(1- ¢1 8)(1- B)zt = (1- 01 B)at 
Ljung-Box 
Q-Statistics 
Q(8) = 8.3419. Significance Level 0.21411222 
Q(16) = 15.0347. Significance Level 0.37578356 
4.1.2 ARIMA model of Middle Atlantic 
1.00 
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Figure 3: Middle Atlantic with ARIMA(2, 1,0) 
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From Middle Atlantic's production cost in Figure 3 and its ACF and PACF graph in 
Figure 4 in Appendix A suggest that the mean of its production cost is nonstationary 
because the ACF slowly decays to zero. Differencing ACF and PACF of Middle Atlantic were 
presented in Figure 3 above. The shape of differencing ACF and PACF suggests the 
ARIMAl(2, 1,0) model with C being constrained to zero. ACF seems to decay while PACF 
cuts off toward zero. The ARIMA(2, 1,0) implies that the mean of production cost from month 
to month is not constant through time (its production cost appears to be fluctuating). 
From Table 3 below, all coefficients are statistically significant different from zero, 
their absolute t-statistic values, -6.60335 and -2.49236, are more than 2.0. The a-statistics 
are tested for a group of autocorrelations calculated at lag 8, 16 and 24, respectively, and all 
of them do not exceed the appropriate value in a chi-square table in Table 1 in Appendix B. 






ARIMA(2, 1,0) with C constrained to zero 
¢, = -0.65584 (-6.60335), <P2 = -0.24740 (-2.49236) 
(1- </J1 B-</J2B 2 )(1- B)z1 = Bt 
a(8) = 0.7394. Significance Level 0.99360039 
a(16) = 1.4226. Significance Level 0.99999016 
a(24) = 3.2240. Significance Level 0.99999890 
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4.1.3 ARIMA model of EastNorth Central 
1.00 
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Figure 4: EastNorth Central with ARIMA(1, 1, 1) 
The monthly production cost of EastNorth Central in Figure 5 in Appendix A seems 
to have a constant mean but its ACF in Figure 6 in Appendix A slowly damps out toward 
zero. It implies that the mean of the production cost is nonstationary. Therefore, differencing 
is suggested. Figure 4 above is the differencing ACF and PACF graph. Both ACF and PACF 
cut off toward zero quickly after lag 1 suggested an ARIMA(1, 1, 1 ). ACF is an indicator for a 
stationary. If it slowly tails off toward zero then its mean is indicated as nonstationary. An 
ARIMA(1, 1, 1) of EastNorth Central suggests that the production cost is changing by month 
to month. 
From Table 4, all coefficients are statistically significant different from zero (their 
absolute t-statistic values are more than 2.0). The Q-statistics at lag 8, 16 do not exceed the 
appropriate value in a chi-square Table in Table 1 in Appendix B. 
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Table 4: EastNorth Central in Estimation and Diagnostic steps 





<Pi = -0.85791 (-5.07507), e1 = o.87589 (4.96320) 
(1- ¢1 8)(1- B)zt = (1- e1 B)at 
0(8) = 7.6832. Significance Level 0.26224 720 
0(16) = 13.1733. Significance Level 0.51292686 
0(24) = 15. 7297. Significance Level 0.82906916 
4.1.4 ARI MA model of South Atlantic 
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Figure 5: South Atlantic with ARIMA(O, 1,0)(1,0,0)12 
The monthly production cost of South Atlantic in Figure 7 in Appendix A is obviously 
fluctuating; therefore, its mean seems nonstationary. The nonstationary mean is confirmed 
in Figure 8 in Appendix A when ACF tails off toward zero very slowly. Figure 5 above is the 
ACF and PACF after being differenced. The first few lags of ACF and PACF graph above 
are no significantly different from zero, their absolute t-statistic values are less than 2.0, then 
an ARIMA(0, 1,0) is suggested. 
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If considering a periodic behavior of a monthly production cost time series, 12 
months is the length for seasonality. The lags 5, 17, and 29 have a seasonal behavior. The 
ACF and PACF graph sometimes do not obviously imply if they either tails off or cut off 
toward zero unless we have to check absolute t-statistic values of their coefficients. 
Therefore, both seasonal ACF and seasonal PACF are investigated by checking if absolute 
t-statistic values of their coefficients are significant from zero, in this case, (1,0,0)12 is 
suitable based on its coefficient as well as in Table 5 below. 
An ARIMA(O, 1,0)(1,0,0)12 is applied for South Atlantic because the mean of its 
production cost changes over time. The production cost seems to go down after September, 
1985. After differencing, the seasonal is provided at lag 5, 17, 29, ... (by length 12). 
Table 5: South Atlantic in Estimation and Diagnostic steps 
South Atlantic ARIMA(O, 1,0)(1,0,0)12 with C constrained to zero 




(1- <D12B12)(1-B)zt =at 
0(8) = 7.5580. Significance Level 0.37317267 
0(16) = 12.0523. Significance Level 0.67506589 
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4.1.5 ARIMA model of EastSouth Central 
1.00 
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Figure 6: EastSouth Central with ARIMA(O, 1, 1) 
EastSouth Central's production cost in Figure 9 in Appendix A seems to have a 
stationary mean but its ACF in Figure 10 in Appendix A shows that the mean is 
nonstationary. Figure 6 above is the ACF and PACF after being differenced. An 
ARIMA(O, 1, 1) is suggested because ACF cuts off toward zero after lag 1 while PACF tails 
off toward zero quickly. It is also suggested that the month-to-month production cost is 
changing (nonstationary). Its coefficient ( 81 ), Backshift notation, and Q-statistic can be seen 
at Table 6 below. 






ARIMA(O, 1, 1) with C constrained to zero 
()1 = -0.25719 (-2.57508) 
(1- B)z, =(1- B1B)a, 
Q(8) = 5.7118. Significance Level 0.57377598 
0(16) = 10.2999. Significance Level 0.80046239 
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4.1.6 ARIMA model for WestSouth Central 
1.00 
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Figure 7: WestSouth Central with ARIMA(1, 1, 1 )(1,0,0)12 
Figure 11 in Appendix A presents that WestSouth Central's monthly production cost 
is periodically changing. Its ACF, in Figure 12 in Appendix A, slowly tails off toward zero that 
means it has a nonstationary mean. Figure 7 above is the differencing ACF and PACF. An 
ARIMA(1, 1, 1) is suitable for WestSouth Central because ACF and PACF cut off toward zero 
after lag 1 and their absolute t-statistic values are more than 2.0 {Table 7 below). 
As mentioned earlier, its production cost is periodically changing over time that 
implies its mean is nonstationary. The ACF at Figure 7 above contains seasonal 
observations at lag 12 and 24. The seasonal ACF and PACF suggest an 
ARIMA(1, 1, 1 )(1,0,0)12 in the identification stage. At the Estimation stage, all coefficients are 
estimated and their absolute t-statistic values are investigated as well as a-statistics in 
Table 7 below. 
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Table 7: WestSouth Central in Estimation and Diagnostic steps 





¢1 = o.53716 (3.99360), e1 = -0.86862 (-10.85320), 
<1>12 = 0.46728 (4.52075) 
(1-¢1 8)(1- <I>12B
12 )(1- B)zt = (1- e1B )at 
0(8) = 0.9570. Significance Level 0.96596084 
0(16) = 2.7428. Significance Level 0.99871407 
4.1. 7 ARIMA model for Pacific 
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Figure 8: Pacific with ARIMA(2, 1,0) 
The production costs of Pacific in Figure 13 and ACF and PACF in Figure 14 in 
Appendix A represent that the mean is not stationary. ACF tails off toward zero slowly. 
Figure 8 above, the differenced ACF tails off while differenced PACF cuts off toward zero 
after lag 2 and an ARIMA(2, 1,0) is suggested for Pacific. The ARIMA(2, 1,0) implies that the 
mean of the month-to-month production cost is nonstationary and needed to be differenced. 
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The estimated coefficients in the estimation stage, <A and </J2 , are shown in Table 8 
below. Their absolute t-statistic values as well as Q-statistics are calculated in the 
Diagnostic stage. 
Table 8: Pacific in Estimation and Diagnostic steps 
Pacific ARIMA(2, 1,0) with C constrained to zero 
Coefficients </J1 = -0.40868 (-4.24921), </J2 = -0.25869 (-2.91239) 
Backshift notation (1- ¢1 B- </J2 82)(1- B) :Z1 = a1 
Ljung-Box 
Q-Statistics 
Q(8) = 6.2956. Significance Level 0.39090015 
Q(16) = 10.4895. Significance Level 0.72559007 
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4.2 Results 
In this section, the number of winning auctions and total profit in 24 auctions will be 
compared between applying the new mechanism and optimal bidding strategy. There are 
three cases in this section. First case, Middle Atlantic is the supplier applying the new 
mechanism to adjust its bid to win on the margin and other suppliers are using the optimal 
bidding strategy to construct their optimal bid. The second and third cases are assigning 
EastNorth Central and Pacific as a supplier. 
In this experiment there are monthly auctions from January, 1989 to December, 1990 
(24 auctions mentioned before). In each auction, assume that they are seven suppliers 
competing to win to supply an electric power. The experiment compares the result when 
they are seven suppliers with two demands, three demands, four demands, and five 
demands. The supplier's average bid is calculated from the new mechanism. The supplier's 
optimal bid is calculated from the optimal bidding strategy. And the margin bid is also 
calculated from the optimal bidding strategy, where this bid is supposed to win on the 
margin (if all competitors, including the supplier itself, are using the optimal bidding strategy 
in the auction). 
In each graph, the x-axis represents year and month starting from January, 1989, to 
December, 1990. The y-axis represents the supplier's optimal bid, the average bid obtained 
from the new mechanism, and the margin bid. The graph presents the supplier's own 
optimal bid and the average bid together in order to compare their offered bid against the 
margin bid. The number of winning auctions, percentage of winning auctions, and total profit 
of applying the new mechanism and applying the optimal bidding strategy in 24 auctions are 
listed in each graph as well. 
In each auction, the average bid is compared with the margin bid in order to provide 
if the average bid is a winning bid on the margin, it must be smaller than the margin bid, and 
the profit, subtracting the production cost from the average bid. The profit is zero when the 
supplier does not win that auction. The optimal bid is also compared with the margin bid in 
the same way. The total number of winning auctions and total profit are calculated from 24 
auctions. 
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4.2.1 Case 1: Middle Atlantic is a supplier 
When applying the new mechanism in a 2-demands auction in Figure 9, its 
percentage of winning auction is 62.50% compared with 37.50% from applying the optimal 
bidding strategy and its total profit is $18.235 while $14.414 with the optimal bidding 
strategy. At the auction with 3 demands in Figure 10, the new mechanism increases the 
percentage of winning auction to 75.00% from 58.33% and its total profit also increases to 
$43.08. 
But at the auction with 4 demands in Figure 11, the number of winning auctions 
decreases to 62.50% from 70.83%. Its profit is also reduced to $53.331 from $63.759. The 
interesting result happens at the auction with 5 demands, the number of winning auctions 
from both of them is 100% but their profits are different. 
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- - - - - - - Optimal Bid 
Number of Percentage of Total profit 
winninQ auctions winning auctions ($) 
Apply with the new 15 62.50% $18.235 
mechanism 
The optimal bid 9 37.50% $14.414 
Figure 9: Middle Atlantic with the result in 2 demands auction 
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Middle Atlantic with 6 suppliers and 3 demands 
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- - - - - - - Optimal Bid 
Number of Percentage of Total profit 
winninq auctions winning auctions ($) 
Apply with the new 18 75.00% $43.080 
mechanism 
The optimal bid 14 58.33% $38.619 
Figure 10: Middle Atlantic with the result in 3 demands auction 
Middle Atlantic with 6 suppliers and 4 demands 
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- - - - - - - Optimal Bid 
Number of Percentage of Total profit 
winning auctions winninq auctions ($) 
Apply with the new 15 62.50% $53.331 
mechanism 
The optimal bid 17 70.83% $63.759 
Figure 11: Middle Atlantic with the result in 4 demands auction 
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Middle Atlantic with 6 suppliers and 5 demands 
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Figure 12: Middle Atlantic with the result in 5 demands auction 
4.2.2 Case 2: EastNorth Central is a supplier 
When applying the new mechanism in a 2-demands auction in Figure 13, the new 
mechanism increases the number of winning auctions by 58.33% comparing with 4.17% 
from applying the optimal bidding strategy and its profit also increases to $15.156 from 
$1.633. Notice that the optimal offered bid line is above the margin bid line almost all the 
time indicated that its production costs are high; hence, it has not much chance to win on 
the margin. 
In the 3-demands auction in Figure 14, the new mechanism improves 75.00% 
chance to win on the margin compared with 50.00%. The new mechanism also increases a 
profit $42.126 from $30.851. However, in the 4-demands auction in Figure 15, the number of 
winning auctions of both applying the new mechanism and optimal bids is 87.50% but the 
total profit of applying the new mechanism is lower than the other. The result of the 5-
demands auction in Figure 16 is the same way as in a 4-demands auction that the number 
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of winning for both of them is 100.00% but the total profit of applying the average bids is 
lower, $116.309. 
Eastnorth Central with 6 suppliers and 2 demands 
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Number of Percentage of Total profit 
winning auctions winning auctions ($) 
Apply with the new 14 58.33% $15.156 
mechanism 
The optimal bid 1 4.17% $1.633 
Figure 13: EastNorth Central with the result in 2 demands auction 
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· · · - · · · Optimal Bid 
Number of Percentage of Total profit 
winning auctions winning auctions ($) 
Apply with the new 18 75.00% $42.126 
mechanism 
The optimal bid 12 50.00% $30.851 
Figure 14: EastNorth Central with the result in 3 demands auction 
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Eastnorth Central with 6 suppliers and 4 demands 
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Figure 15: EastNorth Central with the result in 4 demands auction 
Eastnorth Central with 6 suppliers and 5 demands 
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Figure 16: EastNorth Central with the result in 5 demands auction 
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4.2.3 Case 3: Pacific is a supplier 
In a 2-demands auction in Figure 17, the percentage of winning auctions is 75.00% 
with the new mechanism for 24 auctions while it is only 20.83% with the optimal bidding 
strategy. The profit of applying the new mechanism is $20.104 while it is only $13. 773 in the 
optimal bids. The similar result can be seen in the 3 demands auction in Figure 18 where 
the percentage of winning auctions of applying the new mechanism is higher than that with 
the optimal bidding strategy, 75.00% against 20.83%, and its profit also higher than the 
other. In a 3-demands auction, the optimal bids are above the margin bids in 19 auctions 
while applying the new mechanism are above the margin bid only 6 auctions. Therefore, the 
total profit of apply the new mechanism is also higher than that in the other one 
approximately $19.801 ($38.964 -$19.163 = 19.801 ). In a 4-demands auction in Figure 19, 
the result is also similar. Applying the new mechanism has more chances to win than 
applying the optimal bidding strategy and its total profit is also higher. Its percentage of 
winning auctions is 87.50% and its total profit is $74.336. While, if applying the optimal 
bidding strategy alone, its percentage of winning auctions is only 41.67% and its total profit 
is about $43.157. 
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Figure 17: Pacific with the result in 2 demands auction 
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Pacific with 6 suppliers and 3 demands 
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Figure 18: Pacific with the result in 3 demands auction 
Pacific with 6 suppliers and 4 demands 
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Figure 19: Pacific with the result in 4 demands auction 
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Figure 20: Pacific with the result in 5 demands auction 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Conclusions 
A mechanism was presented to adjust one supplier's offered bid to win on the margin 
in the electric power auction by forecasting competitors' production cost and applying the 
optimal bidding strategy. Univariate time series analyses are conducted to build an ARIMA 
model for production costs. The accurate forecast for competitors' production cost depends 
on how well the ARIMA model fits its previous information as well as the availability of 
production cost information. 
According to 11 successful winning cases from total 12 cases in the result section of 
chapter 4, a number of winning auctions of applying the new mechanism is higher than or 
equals to a number of winning auctions of applying the optimal bidding strategy indicated 
that applying the new mechanism improves a number of winning auctions compared with 
applying the optimal bidding strategy. If a number of winning auctions of applying the new 
mechanism are higher than that of applying the optimal bidding strategy, its total profit is 
also higher. 
It appears that the new mechanism outperforms the optimal bidding strategy 
because of more accurate information on the production costs. The bids are based on the 
uniform distribution of the production costs. Therefore, a better estimate of the minimum 
and maximum production costs should offer a short-term advantage. 
5.2 Discussion 
This work is limited by assuming that all competitors are using the same strategy, the 
optimal bidding strategy, to construct their optimal offered bid. In fact, each supplier has its 
own strategy to create its offered bid to win the auction and maximize its profit. An electric 
power demand varies with time. For example, the demand is high during summer and winter 
seasons and low during spring season. Therefore, the mechanism should be flexible to 
adjust a number of demands instead of a constant demand. The production cost of each 
supplier may be not the same as the production cost from coal in this work because each 
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supplier might add other costs into its production cost. This work assumes that all suppliers 
raise their bids above their production cost. But, in fact, some suppliers may auction with an 
offered bid that is less than its production cost in order to block other suppliers to win the 
auction. 
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APPENDIX A: A PRODUCTION COST GRAPH AND THE IDENTIFICATION 
GRAPH FOR EACH SUPPLIER 
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Figure 3: Middle Atlantic's Production Cost 
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Figure 9: EastSouth Central's Production Cost 
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Figure 1 O: EastSouth Central in the Identification Step 
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Figure 12: WestSouth Central in the Identification Step 
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Figure 14: Pacific in the Identification Step 
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APPENDIX B: A TABLE OF CRITICAL CHI-SQUARE VALUES 
Table 1: Chi-squared Table 
~ .250 .100 .050 .025 .010 .005 .001 
1 1.32 2.71 3.84 5.02 6.63 7.88 10.8 
2 2.77 4.61 5.90 7.38 9.21 10.6 13.8 
3 4.11 6.25 7.81 9.35 11.3 12.8 16.3 
4 5.39 7.78 9.49 11.1 13.3 14.9 18.5 
5 6.63 9.24 11.1 12.8 15.1 16.7 20.5 
6 7.84 10.6 12.6 14.4 16.8 18.5 22.5 
7 9.04 12.0 14.1 16.0 18.5 20.3 24.3 
8 10.2 13.4 15.5 17.5 20.1 22.0 26.1 
9 11.4 14.7 16.9 19.0 21.7 23.6 27.9 
10 12.5 16.0 18.3 20.5 23.2 25.2 29.6 
11 13.7 17.3 19.7 21.9 24.7 26.8 31.3 
12 14.8 18.5 21.0 23.3 26.2 28.3 32.9 
13 16.0 19.8 22.4 24.7 27.7 29.8 34.5 
14 17.1 21.1 23.7 26.1 29.1 31.3 36.1 
15 18.2 22.3 25.0 27.5 30.6 32.8 37.7 
16 19.4 23.5 26.3 28.8 32.0 34.3 39.3 
17 20.5 24.8 27.6 30.2 33.4 35.7 40.8 
18 21.6 26.0 28.9 31.5 34.8 37.2 42.3 
19 22.7 27.2 30.1 32.9 36.2 38.6 32.8 
20 23.8 28.4 31.4 34.2 37.6 40.0 45.3 
21 24.9 29.6 32.7 35.5 38.9 31.3 46.8 
22 26.0 30.8 33.9 36.8 40.3 42.8 48.3 
23 27.1 32.0 35.2 38.1 41.6 44.2 49.7 
24 28.2 33.2 35.4 39.4 32.0 45.6 51.2 
25 29.3 34.4 37.7 40.6 44.3 46.9 52.6 
26 30.4 35.6 38.9 41.9 45.6 48.3 54.1 
27 31.5 36.7 40.1 43.2 47.0 49.6 55.5 
28 32.6 37.9 41.3 44.5 48.3 51.0 56.9 
29 33.7 39.1 42.6 45.7 49.6 52.3 58.3 
Source: Ronald J. Wonnacott and Thomas H. Wonnacott, Econometrics, 2nd 
ed., John Wiley & Sons, 1979. 
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APPENDIX C: JAVASCRIPT PROGRAMS AND SOURCE CODES 
Enter number of suppliers 17 .... .... .. 
Enter number of demands ~ 
Enter interval of cost production between~ and~ 




B(c) = c + r---(IH(c) + R(c)) = 
Figure 1: The JavaScript web-based program for 7 suppliers and 2 demands 
'Ji E nler number of pa1hc1patmg suppliers - M1cmsoft lnlemet E xpl01e1 provrded bi> Ametrca Onlme fllllr;J £i 
Enter number of suppliers~ 
Enter number of demands ~ 
Enter interval of cost production between~ and~ 




B(c) = c + r---(IH(c) + R(c)) = 
Figure 2: The JavaScript web-based program for 7 suppliers and 3 demands 
Enter number of suppliers P-
Enter number of demands i;r--
Enter interval of cost production between~: and~ 









Figure 3: The web-based program for 7 suppliers and 4 demands 
Enter number of suppliers P-
Enter number of demands rs--
Enter interval of cost production between~ and~ 




Jc c2(II+R)dc = 
(/H(c) + R(c)) = 
Figure 4: The JavaScript web-based program for 7 suppliers and 5 demands 
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Table 1: Source code of the program in Figure 1 in Appendix C 
<html> 
<head> 
<meta http-equiv="Content-Language" content="en-us"> 
<meta http-eq uiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=windows-1252"> 
<meta name="GENERATOR" content="Microsoft FrontPage 4.0"> 
<title>Enter number of participating suppliers</title> 
<SCRIPT LANGUAGE="JavaScript"> 
function FindAllResults(form) { 
suppliers= eval(form.suppliers.value); 
demands = eval(form.demands.value); 
c1 = eval(form.c1 .value); 
c2 = eval(form.c2.value); 
c = eval(form.c.value); 
PrOtherMore = (c2 - c)/(c2-c1 ); 
PrOtherless = ( c-c1 )/( c2-c1 ); 
II Ill II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II 1111111111111111111111111 R's part 
YourR =O; 
YourH =O; 




factDiffer =1; · 
Rtempless = Math.pow(PrOtherless,j); 
RtempMore = Math.pow(PrOtherMore,suppliers-1-j); 
for (i=1 ;i<=suppliers-1; i++) { fact1 = i*fact1; } 
if U==O ) { fact2=1 ;} 
else {for (i=1 ;i<=j; i++) { fact2 = i*fact2; }} 
II Find factorial of n-1 
II Find factorial of j 
for (i=1 ;i<=suppliers-1-j; i++) { factDiffer = i*factDiffer; } II Find factorial of (n-1-j) 
YourR = YourR + (fact1/fact2/factDiffer)*Rtempless*RtempMore; 
} II end R's part 




Htempless = Math.pow(PrOtherless,demands-1); 
HtempMore = Math.pow(PrOtherMore,suppliers-demands); 
for {i=1 ;i<=suppliers-1; i++) { factH1 = i*factH1;} 
for U=O;j<=demands-1 ;j++) 
{ 
if U==O) { factH2=1 ;} 
else { factH2 = j*factH2; } 
II Find factorial of j 
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} 
for (i=1 ;i<=suppliers-demands; i++) { factHDiffer = i*factHDiffer;} //factorial of (n-1-j) 
YourH = (factH 1 /factH2/factH Differ)*HtempLess*HtempMore; 
/////////////I/ II I /I Ill/ II///// I///// I/ II////// I/ I////// I// I///////// I////////// I//// I/////// II/ End H's part 
form.R.value = YourR; 
form.H.value = YourH; 
form.HandR.value = YourR + YourH; 
/ l//l///////l///////l///////l/////l////l//////l//////l////l//////l///////l//////I////////////// H + R with integrate 
textTemp = 1111 ; 
Uppers = c2-c1; 
Lowers = c-c1 ; 
form.C1 C2devide.value = 1/(Math.pow(c2-c1 ,suppliers-1 )); 





for (i=1 ;i<=suppliers-1; i++) { fact1 = i*fact1;} 
if U==O) { fact2=1 ;} 
else {for {i=1 ;i<=j; i++) { fact2 = i*fact2; }} 
II Find factorial of n-1 
II Find factorial of j 
for (i=1 ;i<=suppliers-1-j; i++) { factDiffer = i*factDiffer; } // Find factorial of (n-1-j) 
textTemp = textTemp + 11 { 11 + (fact11fact2/factDiffer) + 11 ) 11+ 11*11 + 11 xA11 + j + 11 ( 11 + 
Uppers+ 11-x)A11 + (suppliers-1-j); 
if U<=demands-2) { texffemp = texffemp + 11 + 11 ;} 
} 
textTemp = textTemp + 11 ===> integrate from 11 + Lowers + 11 to 11 + Uppers ; 
form.long.value = textTemp; 
////// 
FirstValue = 531441*UpperS - 32805*(Math.pow(UpperS,3)) + 7290*(Math.pow(UpperS,4)) 
- 729*(Math.pow(UpperS,5)) + 36*(Math.pow(UpperS,6)) - (5*(Math.pow(UpperS,7)))/7; 
SecondValue = 531441*LowerS - 32805*(Math.pow(LowerS,3)) + 
7290*(Math.pow(LowerS,4)) - 729*(Math.pow(LowerS,5)) + 36*(Math.pow(LowerS,6)) -
(5*(Math.pow(LowerS,7)))/7; 
form.RandHafterlntegrate.value = FirstValue - SecondValue; 
////// 
} 
function FinalResult(form) { 
suppliers= eval(form.suppliers.value); 
demands = eval(form.demands.value); 
c1 = eval(form.c1 .value); 
c2 = eval(form.c2.value); 
c = eval(form.c.value); 
//Afterlntegrate = eval(form. RandHafterlntegrate. value); 
RepeatH = eval(form.H.value); 
RepeatR = eval(form.R.value); 
Both = RepeatH + RepeatR; 
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RandHafterlntegrate = eval(form.RandHafterlntegrate.value); 





<form method="POST" NAME="theForm"> 
<p>Enter number of suppliers <input type="text" name="suppliers" size="6"></p> 
<p>Enter number of demands <input type="text" name="demands" size="6"></p> 
<p>Enter interval of cost production between <input type="text" name="c1" size="6"> 
and <input type="text" name="c2" size="6"></p> 
<p>Enter your cost of production <input type="text" name="c" size="6"></p> 
<p><input type="button" value="Submit" name="B1" 
onClick="FindAllResults(this.form)"><input type="reset" value="Reset" name="B2"></p> 
<hr> 
<p align="center"><b><u><font size="5">Result</font></u></b></p> 
<p>Your R =<input type="text" name="R" size="20"></p> 
<p>Your H =<input type="text" name="H" size="20"></p> 
<p>Your H + R =<input type="text" name="HandR" size="20"></p> 
<p><span style="font-size: 14.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; 
font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New 
Roman&q uot;; 
mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language:AR-
SA">&#87 4 7;<sub>c</sub></span><span style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 
12.0pt; font-family: Times New Roman; mso-fareast-font-family: Times New Roman; mso-
ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-
SA"><sup>c2</sup></span>(H+R)dc 
= <input type="text" name="C1 C2devide" size="1 O"><span style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-
bidi-font-size: 12.0pt"><sup>* 
</sup></span> <input type="text" name="long" size="94"></p> 
<p><input type="button" value="Submit" name="B3" onClick="FinalResult(this.form)"></p> 
<p>B{c) = c +<input type="text" name="RandHafterlntegrate" size="1 O">(/H(c) + 





Table 2: Source code of the program in Figure 2 in Appendix C 
<html> 
<head> 
<meta http-equiv="Content-Language" content="en-us"> 
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=windows-1252"> 
<meta name="GENERATOR" content="Microsoft FrontPage 4.0"> 
<title>Enter number of participating suppliers<ltitle> 
<SCRIPT LANGUAGE="JavaScript"> 
function FindAllResults(form) { 
suppliers= eval(form.suppliers.value); 
demands = eval(form.demands.value); 
c1 = eval(form.c1 .value); 
c2 = eval(form.c2.value); 
c = eval(form.c.value); 
PrOtherMore = ( c2 - c)I( c2-c1 ); 
PrOtherless = ( c-c1 )I( c2-c1 ); 
I I I I I II I I II I I II I II I I II I I II I I II II I II I I II I I II I I II I I II I I II/// II I I II I I II I I II I II II I I II I I II I I II I I 11111 R's part 
YourR =O; 
YourH =O; 





Rtempless = Math.pow(PrOtherless,j); 
RtempMore = Math.pow(PrOtherMore,suppliers-1-j); 
for (i=1 ;i<=suppliers-1; i++) { fact1 = i*fact1;} 
if U==O ) { fact2=1 ;} 
else {for (i=1 ;i<=j; i++) { fact2 = i*fact2; }} 
II Find factorial of n-1 
II Find factorial of j 
for (i=1 ;i<=suppliers-1-j; i++) { factDiffer = i*factDiffer; } II Find factorial of (n-1-j) 
YourR = YourR + (fact11fact21factDiffer)*Rtempless*RtempMore; 
} 11 end R's part 




Htempless = Math.pow(PrOtherless,demands-1); 
HtempMore = Math.pow(PrOtherMore,suppliers-demands); 
for (i=1 ;i<=suppliers-1; i++) { factH1 = i*factH1;} 
for U=O;j<=demands-1 ;j++) 
{ 
} 
if U==O) { factH2=1 ;} 
else { factH2 = j*factH2; } 
II Find factorial of j 
for (i=1 ;i<=suppliers-demands; i++} { factHDiffer = i*factHDiffer;} II factorial of (n-1-j) 
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YourH = (factH 1 /factH2/factHDiffer)*HtempLess*HtempMore; 
Ill I I I I I I II I I I I II I I I II I I I I II II I I I I I II I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I II II I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I II I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Ill I End H's part 
form.R.value = YourR; 
form.H.value = YourH; 
form.HandR.value = YourR + YourH; 
I II I I I II Ill II II I II I I II I I II I I I I II I I I I I I II I II I I I I I I I I II I I I II II I I I I I I II II I I I II II I I I I I I/I/Ill I I I I/I H + R with integrate 
textTemp = ""; 
Uppers = c2-c1; 
LowerB = c-c1 ; 
form.C1 C2devide.value = 1/(Math.pow(c2-c1 ,suppliers-1 )); 





for (i=1 ;i<=suppliers-1; i++) { fact1 = i*fact1; } 
if U==O ) { fact2= 1 ;} 
else {for (i=1 ;i<=j; i++) { fact2 = i*fact2; }} 
II Find factorial of n-1 
II Find factorial of j 
for (i=1 ;i<=suppliers-1-j; i++) { factDiffer = i*factDiffer; } // Find factorial of (n-1-j) 
textTemp = textTemp + "(" + (fact1/fact2/factDiffer) + ")"+ "*" +" xA" + j + "(" + 
UpperB + "-x)A" + (suppliers-1-j); 
if U<=demands-2) { textTemp = textTemp + "+ ";} 
} 
textTemp = textTemp + " ===> integrate from " + Lowers + "to" + UpperB ; 
form.long.value = textTemp; 
II/Ill 
FirstValue = 531441*UpperB - 3645*(Math.pow(UpperB,4)) + 729*(Math.pow(UpperB,5))-
54*(Math.pow(UpperB,6)) + (1 O*(Math.pow(UpperB,7)))/7; 
SecondValue = 531441*LowerB - 3645*(Math.pow(LowerB,4)) + 729*(Math.pow(LowerB,5)) 
- 54*(Math.pow(LowerB,6)) + (10*(Math.pow(LowerB,7)))/7; 
form.RandHafterlntegrate.value = FirstValue - SecondValue; 
Ill/II 
} 
function FinalResult(form) { 
suppliers = eval(form.suppliers. value); 
demands = eval(form.demands.value); 
c1 = eval(form.c1 .value); 
c2 = eval(form.c2.value); 
c = eval(form.c.value); 
//Afterlntegrate = eval(form.RandHafterlntegrate.value); 
RepeatH = eval(form.H.value); 
RepeatR = eval(form.R.value); 
Both = RepeatH + RepeatR; 
RandHafterlntegrate = eval(form.RandHafterlntegrate.value); 





<form method="POST" NAME="theForm"> 
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<p>Enter number of suppliers <input type="text" name="suppliers" size="6"></p> 
<p>Enter number of demands <input type="text" name="demands" size="6"></p> 
<p>Enter interval of cost production between <input type="text" name="c1" size="6"> 
and <input type="text" name="c2" size="6"></p> 
<p>Enter your cost of production <input type="text" name="c" size="6"></p> 
<p><input type="button" value="Submit" name="B1" 
onClick="FindAllResults(this. form)"><input type="reset" value=" Reset" name="B2"></p> 
<hr> 
<p align="center"><b><u><font size="5">Result</font></u></b></p> 
<p>Your R =<input type="text" name="R" size="20"></p> 
<p>Your H =<input type="text" name="H" size="20"></p> 
<p>Your H + R =<input type="text" name="HandR" size="20"></p> 
<p><span style="font-size: 14.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; 
font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New 
Roman&quot;; 
mso-ansi-lang uage: EN-US; mso-fareast-lang uage: EN-US; mso-bidi-lang uage:AR-
SA">&#87 4 7;<sub>c</sub></span><span style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 
12.0pt; font-family: Times New Roman; mso-fareast-font-family: Times New Roman; mso-
ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-
SA"><sup>c2</sup></span>{H+R)dc 
=<input type="text" name="C1C2devide" size="10"><span style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-
bidi-font-size: 12.0pt"><sup>* 
</sup></span> <input type="text" name="long" size="94"></p> 
<p><input type="button" value="Find Optimal Bid" name="B3" 
onClick="FinalResult(this.form)"></p> 
<p>B(c) = c +<input type="text" name="RandHafterlntegrate" size="1 O">(/H(c) + 





Table 3: Source code of the program in Figure 3 in Appendix C 
<html> 
<head> 
<meta http-equiv="Content-Language" content="en-us"> 
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=windows-1252"> 
<meta name="GENERATOR" content="Microsoft FrontPage 4.0"> 
<title>Enter number of participating suppliers<ltitle> 
<SCRIPT LANGUAGE="JavaScript"> 
function FindAllResults(form) { 
suppliers = eval(form.suppliers. value); 
demands = eval(form.demands.value); 
c1 = eval(form.c1 .value); 
c2 = eval(form.c2.value); 
c = eval(form.c. value); 
PrOtherMore = (c2 - c)l(c2-c1 ); 
PrOtherless = ( c-c1 )I( c2-c1 ); 
1111 I II II II II II I II I I I I II I I II I I I I I I I Ill I I I llll I I llllllll llllll I llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll R's part 
YourR =O; 
YourH =O; 





Rtempless = Math.pow(PrOtherless,j); 
RtempMore = Math.pow(PrOtherMore,suppliers-1-j); 
for (i=1 ;i<=suppliers-1; i++) { fact1 = i*fact1;} 
if U==O ) { fact2=1 ;} 
else {for (i=1 ;i<=j; i++) { fact2 = i*fact2; }} 
II Find factorial of n-1 
II Find factorial of j 
for (i=1 ;i<=suppliers-1-j; i++) { factDiffer = i*factDiffer;} II Find factorial of (n-1-j) 
YourR = YourR + (fact11fact21factDiffer)*Rtempless*RtempMore; 
} II end R's part 




Htempless = Math.pow(PrOtherless,demands-1 ); 
HtempMore = Math. pow(PrOtherMore,suppliers-demands ); 
for (i=1 ;i<=suppliers-1; i++) { factH1 = i*factH1;} 
for U=O;j<=demands-1 ;j++) 
{ 
} 
if U==O) { factH2=1 ;} 
else { factH2 = j*factH2; } 
II Find factorial of j 
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for (i=1 ;i<=suppliers-demands; i++) { factHDiffer = i*factHDiffer;} //Find factorial of (n-1-j) 
YourH = (factH 1 /factH2/factHDiffer)*Htempless*HtempMore; 
/Ill /Ill II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II /Ill II /Ill II II II II /Ill End H's part 
form.R.value = YourR; 
form.H.value = YourH; 
form.HandR.value = YourR + YourH; 
Ill/ II//// II ///I II II II ///I II II II// II II II II /Ill II II II// II II II II II II II II II llll//// II //llll//ll Ill H + R with integrate 
textTemp = 1111 ; 
UpperB = c2-c1; 
LowerB = c-c1; 
form.C1 C2devide.value = 1/(Math.pow(c2-c1 ,suppliers-1 )); 





for (i=1 ;i<=suppliers-1; i++) { fact1 = i*fact1;} 
if U==O ) { fact2=1 ;} 
else {for (i=1 ;i<=j; i++) { fact2 = i*fact2;}} 
II Find factorial of n-1 
II Find factorial of j 
for (i=1 ;i<=suppliers-1-j; i++) { factDiffer = i*factDiffer; } II Find factorial of (n-1-j) 
textTemp = textTemp + 11 ( 11 + (fact1/fact2/factDiffer) + 11 ) 11+ 11*11 + 11 xA11 + j + 11 ( 11 + 
UpperB + 11-x)A11 + (suppliers-1-j); 
if U<=demands-2) { textTemp = textTemp + 11 + 11 ;} 
} 
textTemp = textTemp + 11 ===> integrate from 11 + LowerB + 11 to 11 + UpperB ; 
form.long.value= textTemp; 
Ill/II 
FirstValue = 531441*UpperB - 243*(Math.pow(UpperB,5)) + 36*(Math.pow(UpperB,6)) -
(1 O*(Math.pow(UpperB,7)))/7; 
SecondValue = 531441*LowerB - 243*(Math.pow(LowerB,5)) + 36*(Math.pow(LowerB,6))-
(10*(Math.pow(LowerB,7)))/7; 
form.RandHafterlntegrate.value = FirstValue - SecondValue; 
////// 
} 
function FinalResult(form) { 
suppliers= eval(form.suppliers.value); 
demands = eval(form.demands.value); 
c1 = eval(form.c1 .value); 
c2 = eval(form.c2.value); 
c = eval(form.c.value); 
//Afterlntegrate = eval(form. RandHafterlntegrate. value); 
RepeatH = eval(form.H.value); 
RepeatR = eval(form.R.value); 
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Both = RepeatH + RepeatR; 
RandHafterlntegrate = eval(form.RandHafterlntegrate.value); 





<form method="POST" NAME="theForm"> 
<p>Enter number of suppliers <input type="text" name="suppliers" size="6"></p> 
<p>Enter number of demands <input type="text" name="demands" size="6"></p> 
<p>Enter interval of cost production between <input type="text" name="c1" size="6"> 
and <input type="text" name="c2" size="6"></p> 
<p>Enter your cost of production <input type="text" name="c" size="6"></p> 
<p><input type="button" value="Submit" name="B1" 
onClick="FindAllResults(this.form)"><input type="reset" value="Reset" name="B2"></p> 
<hr> 
<p align="center"><b><u><font size="5">Result</font></u></b></p> 
<p>Your R =<input type="text" name="R" size="20"></p> 
<p>Your H =<input type="text" name="H" size="20"></p> 
<p>Your H + R =<input type="text" name="HandR" size="20"></p> 
<p><span style="font-size: 14. Opt; mso-bid i-font-size: 12. Opt; 
font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New 
Roman&q uot;; 
mso-ansi-lang uage: EN-US; mso-fareast-lang uage: EN-US; mso-bidi-lang uage:AR-
SA">&#87 4 7;<sub>c</sub></span><span style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 
12.0pt; font-family: Times New Roman; mso-fareast-font-family: Times New Roman; mso-
ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-
SA"><sup>c2</sup></span>{H+R)dc 
= <input type="text" name="C1 C2devide" size="1 O"><span style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-
bidi-font-size: 12.0pt"><sup>* 
</sup></span> <input type="text" name="long" size="94"></p> 
<p><input type="button" value="Find Optimal Bid" name="B3" 
onClick="FinalResult(this.form)"></p> 
<p>B{c) = c +<input type="text" name="RandHafterlntegrate" size="10">(/H(c) + 





Table 4: Source code of the program in Figure 4 in Appendix C 
<html> 
<head> 
<meta http-equiv="Content-Language" content="en-us"> 
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=windows-1252"> 
<meta name="GENERATOR" content="Microsoft FrontPage 4.0"> 
<title>Enter number of participating suppliers</title> 
<SCRIPT LANGUAGE="JavaScript"> 
function FindAllResults(form) { 
suppliers= eval(form.suppliers.value); 
demands = eval(form.demands.value); 
c1 = eval(form.c1 .value); 
c2 = eval(form.c2.value); 
c = eval(form.c.value); 
PrOtherMore = (c2 - c)/(c2-c1 ); 
PrOtherless = (c-c1 )/(c2-c1 ); 
II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II// II II II II II II II II II II// II II II II II II R's part 
YourR =O; 
YourH =O; 





Rtempless = Math.pow(PrOtherless,j); 
RtempMore = Math.pow(PrOtherMore,suppliers-1-j); 
for (i=1 ;i<=suppliers-1; i++) { fact1 = i*fact1;} 
if U==O) { fact2=1 ;} 
else {for (i=1;i<=j; i++) { fact2 = i*fact2;}} 
II Find factorial of n-1 
II Find factorial of j 
for (i=1 ;i<=suppliers-1-j; i++) { factDiffer = i*factDiffer; } II Find factorial of (n-1-j) 
YourR = YourR + (fact1/fact2/factDiffer)*Rtempless*RtempMore; 
} II end R's part 




Htempless = Math.pow(PrOtherless,demands-1 ); 
HtempMore = Math. pow(PrOtherMore, suppliers-demands); 
for (i=1 ;i<=suppliers-1; i++) { factH1 = i*factH1;} 
for U=O;j<=demands-1 ;j++) 
{ 
} 
if U==O) { factH2=1 ;} 
else { factH2 = j*factH2; } 
II Find factorial of j 
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for (i=1 ;i<=suppliers-demands; i++) { factHDiffer = i*factHDiffer;} //Find factorial of (n-1-j) 
YourH = (factH 1 /factH2/factHDiffer)*Htempless*HtempMore; 
/llllllllllllll llllllllllllllllllll lllll I I l/lllll II I l/llll I I I I I/Ill/I I I I l//llllll I l//lllllllllll End H's part 
form.R.value = YourR; 
form.H.value = YourH; 
form.HandR.value = YourR + YourH; 
I II I I II II II II II I I I I I II I I II I I II I I I II I I I I II I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Ill I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I II II I I I I I l//l Ill I I I I// H + R with integrate 
textTemp = 1111 ; 
UpperB = c2-c1; 
LowerB = c-c1 ; 
form.C1 C2devide.value = 1/(Math.pow(c2-c1 ,suppliers-1 )); 




factoiffer = 1; 
for (i=1 ;i<=suppliers-1; i++) { fact1 = i*fact1;} 
if U==O ) { fact2=1 ;} 
else {for (i=1 ;i<=j; i++) { fact2 = i*fact2; }} 
II Find factorial of n-1 
II Find factorial of j 
for (i=1 ;i<=suppliers-1-j; i++) { factoiffer = i*factoiffer; } // Find factorial of (n-1-j) 
textTemp = textTemp + 11 ( 11 + (fact1/fact2/factoiffer) + 11 ) 11+ 11*11 + 11 xA11 + j + 11 ( 11 + 
UpperB + 11-x)A11 + (suppliers-1-j); 
if U<=demands-2) { textTemp = textTemp + 11 + 11 ;} 
} 
textTemp = textTemp + 11 ===> integrate from 11 + LowerB + 11 to 11 + UpperB ; 
form.long.value= textTemp; 
II/Ill 
FirstValue = 531441*UpperB - 9*(Math.pow(UpperB,6)) + (5*(Math.pow(UpperB,7)))/7; 
SecondValue = 531441*LowerB - 9*(Math.pow(LowerB,6)) + (5*(Math.pow(LowerB,7)))/7; 
form.RandHafterlntegrate.value = FirstValue - SecondValue; 
II/Ill 
} 
function FinalResult(form) { 
suppliers= eval{form.suppliers.value); 
demands = eval{form.demands.value); 
c1 = eval(form.c1 .value); 
c2 = eval(form.c2.value); 
c = eval(form.c.value); 
//Afterlntegrate = eval(form.RandHafterlntegrate.value); 
RepeatH = eval(form.H.value); 
RepeatR = eval(form.R.value); 
Both = RepeatH + RepeatR; 
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RandHafterlntegrate = eval(form.RandHafterlntegrate.value); 





<form method="POST" NAME="theForm"> 
<p>Enter number of suppliers <input type="text" name="suppliers" size="6"></p> 
<p>Enter number of demands <input type="text" name="demands" size="6"></p> 
<p>Enter interval of cost production between <input type="text" name="c1" size="6"> 
and <input type="text" name="c2" size="6"></p> 
<p>Enter your cost of production <input type="text" name="c" size="6"></p> 
<p><input type="button" value="Submit" name="B1" 
onClick="FindAllResults(this.form)"><input type="reset" value="Reset" name="B2"></p> 
<hr> 
<p align="center"><b><u><font size="5">Result</font></u></b></p> 
<p>Your R =<input type="text" name="R" size="20"></p> 
<p>Your H =<input type="text" name="H" size="20"></p> 
<p>Your H + R =<input type="text" name="HandR" size="20"></p> 
<p><span style="font-size: 14. Opt; mso-bid i-font-size: 12. Opt; 
font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;Times New 
Roman&quot;; 
mso-ansi-lang uage: EN-US; mso-fareast-lang uage: EN-US; mso-bid i-lang uage:AR-
SA">&#87 4 7;<sub>c</sub></span><span style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 
12.0pt; font-family: Times New Roman; mso-fareast-font-family: Times New Roman; mso-
ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-
SA"><sup>c2</sup></span>(H+R)dc 
=<input type="text" name="C1C2devide" size="10"><span style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-
bidi-font-size: 12.0pt"><sup>* 
</sup></span> <input type="text" name="long" size="94"></p> 
<p><input type="button" value="Find Optimal Bid" name="B3" 
onClick="Fi nal Resu lt(th is. form )"></p> 
<p>B(c) = c +<input type="text" name="RandHafterlntegrate" size="1 O">(/H(c) + 
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